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ABSTRACT 
The adoption of carbon market trading in the European Union (EU) was far from assured. Prior 
to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU had been critical of market trading and had expressed grave 
reservations regarding its potential contribution to climate governance. Given this historical 
backdrop, the EU’s conversion to market trading and subsequent vocal championing of the merits of 
this regulatory approach, is particularly intriguing. Whilst emissions trading gradually garnered 
support within the EU, institutionally the Union remained trapped by the normative objections, 
which it had initially articulated against the idea. Such norm entrapment – the inability to pursue a 
preferred policy that violates a norm because of prior rhetorical affirmation of the norm – presented a 
particular dilemma for the EU.  
Paradoxically, the contribution of individual norm entrepreneurs, located within the 
Commission, in reframing emissions trading as an effective and efficient instrument for climate 
governance in the EU proved considerable to unlocking this entrapment dilemma. As a result, a 
concept, which the EU had previously delegitimised as evasive of domestic responsibilities, was 
instead reconstructed as a legitimate strategy to salvage the Kyoto Protocol. As market trading 
internationalises, understanding the drivers and processes by which the EU ETS came to occupy the 
cornerstone of EU climate policy may offer valuable insights to policy-makers and stakeholders 
endeavouring to promote global emissions trading initiatives.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The adoption of carbon market trading in the EU was far from assured. Indeed, 
scholars have chronicled how the rise of emissions trading as the EU’s flagship 
climate policy was a somewhat unexpected development.1 Part I of this Article 
provides an introductory overview of the EU’s conversion to economic 
incentivisation and gradual crystallisation of this policy change in the form of the EU 
ETS. Part II reconsiders the theoretical development of market trading and explores 
the incremental transition from theory to practice. Part III deconstructs the process 
by which the EU implemented the EU ETS and re-examines the crucial role which 
norm entrapment played in constraining an earlier acceptance of market trading. 
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1 See Jon Birger Skjærseth and Jørgen Wettestad, EU Emissions Trading: Initiation, Decision-Making and 
Implementation (Ashgate 2008) for an analysis of the EU’s shift from emissions trading laggard to 
leader. The contributions of Lefevere and  Delebeke – key Commission policy-makers in the 
development of the EU ETS – provide valuable insights into the EU’s conversion to market trading. 
See Jürgen Lefevere, ‘The EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme’ in Farhana 
Yamin (ed), Climate Change and Carbon Markets: A Handbook of Emission Reduction Mechanisms (Earthscan 
2005) 75 and Jos Delbeke, ‘The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): The Cornerstone of the EU’s 
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol’ in Jos Delbeke and others (eds), EU Energy Law, Volume IV: 
Environmental Law: The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (Claeys and Casteels 2006) 1 
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Unsurprisingly, given the EU’s early vocal opposition to economic incentivisation 
approaches, only a particularly discrete combination of factors facilitated an EU 
conversion to market trading. This myriad of factors are considered in greater detail, 
before Part IV assesses the key drivers which facilitated this conversion and suggests 
that the EU’s experience offers salient lessons for third countries considering the 
adoption of market trading. This is particularly so given the EU’s deeply embedded 
normative objections to emissions trading and prior inexperience in deploying 
market instruments in an environmental context. 
Prior to negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU had been hostile to 
market trading and its potential contribution to climate governance. During the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the EU’s position was based on three key principles: a 
commitment to mandatory caps on emissions by developed countries; an 
undifferentiated target of emission reductions of 15%; and what Convery has 
described as “antipathy to emissions trading as a mechanism for achieving these 
targets”.2 There was a concern – also prominently articulated in the academic 
literature – that emissions trading could be construed as a “right to pollute” or as 
“trading in indulgences”, characterisations which might ultimately undermine the 
instrument’s legitimacy and effectiveness.3 Many EU governments were also sceptical 
that market trading could be achieved within a timely window4 and failed to share the 
United States’ singular confidence in market-based solutions to the challenges of 
climate change.5 Some, too, questioned whether American support for the proposal 
may have been less than altruistic.6 Unsurprisingly, the explicit endorsement by the 
Kyoto Protocol of emissions trading7 was affirmed in the United States as a “major 
victory for us”.8 
Given this historical backdrop, the EU’s conversion to market trading, and 
subsequent vocal championing of the merits of this regulatory approach, is 
                                                
2 Frank Convery, ‘Origins and Development of the EU ETS’ (2009) 43 Environmental and Resource 
Economics 391, 393 
3 For example, see Hermann Ott and Wolfgang Sachs, ‘Ethical Aspects of Emissions Trading’ (2000) 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy Paper 110/2000; Robert Goodin, ‘Selling 
Environmental Indulgences’ (1994) 47 Kyklos 573; and, Bruno Frey, “Motivation as a Limit to 
Pricing” (1993) 14 Journal of Economic Psychology 635. 
For more recent ethical analyses of the EU ETS, see Gerd Winter, “The Climate is No Commodity: 
Taking Stock of the Emissions Trading System” (2010) 22(1) Journal of Environmental Law 1; Clive 
Splash, “The Brave New World of Carbon Trading” (2010) 15(2) New Political Economy 169; 
Donald Brown, ‘Ethical Issues Raised by Carbon Trading (Pennsylvania State University: Rock Ethics 
Institute – Climate Ethics, 15 June 2010) < http:// sites.psu.edu/rockblogs/2010/06/15/ethical-issues-
raised-by-carbon-trading/> accessed 17 September 2013; and, Ian Bailey and Sam Maresh, “Scales 
and Networks of Neoliberal Climate Governance: The Regulatory and Territorial Logics of European 
Union Emissions Trading” (2009) 34(4) Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 445. 
4 Marcel Braun and Tilman Santarius, ‘Climate Politics in the Multi-Level Governance System: 
Emissions Trading and Institutional Changes  in Environmental Policy-Making’ (2008) Wuppertal 
Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy Paper 172/2008, 16 
5 Karen Campbell, ‘From Rio to Kyoto: The Use of Voluntary Agreements to Implement the Climate 
Change Convention’ (1998) 7(2) Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law 159, 162 
6 Grubb, Vrolijk, and Brack have noted that some European governments questioned whether the 
United States had introduced emissions trading as a ploy to delay negotiations. 
See Michael Grubb, Christiaan Vrolijk, and Duncan Brack, The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1999) 92 
7 Article 17, Kyoto Protocol 
8 Stuart Eizenstat, ‘Implications of Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change: Statement before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee’ (Washington D.C., 11 February 1998) 
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46812/pdf/CHRG-105shrg46812.pdf > accessed 
16 September 2013 
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particularly intriguing. It is evident too that by so doing the EU has not only 
retreated from its advocacy of more orthodox command-and-control measures in 
climate law, but it has also embraced the centrality of an economic incentivisation 
approach to addressing climate change.9 It is also particularly noteworthy that from 
the earliest European expressions of interest in emissions trading, a vision of a global 
trading architecture was consistently present.10 The EU’s current vision of achieving 
an OECD-wide carbon market by 2015 is the most recent restatement of what was a 
foundational objective of the EU ETS.11 For example, the Commission’s Green 
Paper in early 2000, initiating discussion of the advantages of emissions trading in 
the EU, identified the importance of gaining experience in the implementation of 
such an instrument before international emissions trading commenced.12 Prior to 
commencement of the first phase Jos Delbeke of the Commission’s Directorate 
General for the Environment candidly acknowledged that “for the months and years 
to come, the EU will be on the steep end of the learning curve as regards emissions 
trading …[and] that ‘learning by doing’ is an important in-built feature of the 
Emissions Trading Directive”. Understanding the processes by which the EU ETS 
came to occupy the cornerstone of EU climate policy is therefore of significance to 
the wider prospect of internationalising emissions trading. 
As the EU progresses towards the third phase of its ETS, with development 
of an internationally integrated architecture of emissions trading integral to the EU’s 
vision of global climate governance, it is helpful to recall the origins of market 
trading and the implementation of the concept in the EU. This paper endeavours to 
unpack the concept and provide an understanding of the EU’s adoption and gradual 
positioning of this instrument at the cornerstone of its climate governance regime.  
 
II. THE RISE OF MARKET TRADING 
 
(A) Overview 
Market trading is not only intriguing in the EU climate context merely because of the 
radical volte-face it represented in EU climate policy: it has also become a defining 
characteristic of climate law more generally.13 However, this migration of emissions 
                                                
9 De Cendra, ‘Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An 
Analysis vis-à-vis WTO Law’ (2006) 15(2) RECIEL 131. 
This is all the more striking given that, as Skjærseth explains, “The European Commission [initially] 
had no experience of emissions trading and scant awareness of what an EU ETS could or should look 
like”. 
10 As Convery puts it: “the US was likely to embrace emissions trading as a key policy instrument … 
and compatibility of approach could simultaneously be a useful stimulus to US action and facilitate 
intercontinental trading”. Frank Convery, ‘Origins and Development of the EU ETS’ (2009) 43 
Environmental and Resource Economics 391, 399 
11 Commission, ‘Towards a Comprehensive Climate Change Agreement in Copenhagen’ 
(Communication) COM (2009) 676, 11 
As Türk, Mehling, Flachsland, and Sterk have commented that: “Given the need to harmonize critical 
design features, full bilateral links between OECD company-level cap-and-trade schemes prior to 
2015 appear rather unlikely.” 
See Andreas Türk and others, ‘Linking Carbon Markets: Concepts, Case Studies and Pathways’ (2009) 
9 Climate Policy 341, 350 
12 Commission, ‘Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union’ 
(Communication) COM (2000) 87 final 
13 For example, see generally, Benjamin J Richardson, ‘Climate Law and Economic Policy Instruments: 
A New Field of Environmental Law’ (2004) 1 Environmental Liability 1; and Marjan Peeters, 
‘Inspection and Market-Based Regulation through Emissions Trading: The Striking Reliance on Self-
Monitoring, Self-Reporting and Verification’ (2009) 2(1) Utrecht Law Review 177 
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trading from academic scholarship to practical implementation has been a gradual 
process characterised by intermittent progress. Whilst the influence of market trading 
in environmental law today has been described as a “virtual orthodoxy”, for a 
considerable period the theoretical foundations of today’s current carbon markets 
remained an academic debate with minimal application in practice.14 For example, 
Dryzek still felt justified, writing in 2005, in observing that: “the pace of diffusion of 
economic rationalism into environmental policy practice has been glacial”.15 Even 
though since the 1970s (and before),16 the regulating power of economic 
incentivisation approaches and market trading in particular has been the subject of 
much scientific literature, perhaps most prominently in the field of environmental 
economics, this dialogue had only recently filtered through to policy practice.17 
In view of this historical development, the frequent description of economic 
policy instruments as “new” is somewhat misplaced, as there is little, which is novel 
about the discourse. It is also noteworthy that the practical adoption of such 
instruments, in many instances, has resulted from a much slower and more 
incremental evolution of national environmental policies, rather than a revolution in 
environmental policy formation.18 Traditionally it has more often been the case that 
when economic incentivisation approaches have been introduced, there is no 
wholesale radical departure from the existing regulatory landscape.19 In a very real 
sense, this process resembles von Homeyer’s “institutional layering” thesis of EU 
environmental policy evolution, where governance is characterised “not only by 
change, but also by considerable continuity”.20 
                                                
14 Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad, ‘Prescriptive Environmental Regulations versus Market-Based 
Incentives’ in Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad (eds), Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation: 
Lessons After Twenty Years of Experience (Oxford University Press 2006) 3, 4 
See also Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford 
University Press 1998) 69 who note that ‘regulators, environmentalists and industry alike tended to be 
more comfortable with the familiar terrain of traditional regulation’. 
15 John Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 
137 
16 As early as 1920, Pigou advocated that corrective taxes could function to discourage activities 
generating externalities, long in advance of Dales’ seminal text suggesting that transferable property 
rights could promote environmental protection at a lower cost than traditional standards-based 
regulation. 
See Arthur Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Macmillan Press 1920) and John Dales, Pollution, Property and 
Prices: An Essay in Policy-Making and Economics (Toronto University Press 1968). 
17 Hans Bressers and Dave Huitema, ‘Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection: Can We 
Trust the “Magic Carpet”’ (1999) 20(2) International Political Science Review 175, 176 
18 Andrew Jordan and others, ‘“New” Instruments of Environmental Governance: Patterns and 
Pathways of Change’ (2003) 12(1) Environmental Politics 1, 5 
More broadly, Lindblom suggests true innovation is the exception, rather than the norm in policy-
making and most political change is highly incremental in nature, representing a marginal alteration of 
existing policy goals and instruments. 
See Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision-Making through Mutual Adjustment (Free Press 
1965) 145 -149  
19 As Hahn has observed most economic incentivisation approaches are not “implemented from 
scratch [but] are grafted onto regulatory systems in which permits and standards play a dominant 
role”. 
See Robert Hahn, ‘Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed 
the Doctor’s Orders’ (1989) 3(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 95, 107 
20 Ingmar von Homeyer, ‘The Evolution of EU Environmental Governance’ in Joanne Scott (ed), 
Environmental Protection: European Law and Governance (Oxford University Press 2009) 1, 24 
Whilst a detailed evaluation of the causes of continuity is beyond the scope of this paper, von 
Homeyer has emphasised the influence of path-dependency, a factor which is resonant of Dryzek’s 
emphasis of “the resistance of established routines”. 
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(B) Integrating Theory and Practice 
Until the 1960s economic instruments were tools, which “only existed on 
blackboards and in academic journals, as products of the fertile imaginations of 
academics”.21 However, the economic theory underlying such instruments was 
gaining increasing prominence. Ronald Coase’s seminal work, “The Problem of 
Social Cost”, advanced highly influential propositions about the potential of liability 
rules for the allocation of resources and the distribution of benefits, perspectives 
which were further validated by his receiving the Nobel Prize for Economics in 
1991.22 Building on Coase’s conceptualisation, Dales and others have argued that 
prevailing private property structures fail to capture externalities, which could more 
appropriately be internalised by market trading.23 Gordon and Hardin framed this 
situation as the “tragedy of the commons” – the ideal-type unmanaged pasture where 
shepherds have every reason to continue to over-populate the common pasture with 
livestock advancing their own self-interest and insufficient incentive to consider the 
collective interest.24 More recently, Stern has similarly refashioned the nature of the 
problem of climate change as “market failure on the greatest scale the world has 
seen”.25 
 The intrinsic nature of this approach to an environmental problem also 
serves to indicate the nature of the prescribed solution.26 The economist’s objective 
when seeking to correct such market failures is to integrate or create mechanisms, 
which remedy that failure. Indeed, as Stern has put it, the “appropriate response to a 
substantial market failure is not to abandon markets but to act directly to fix it, 
through taxes, other forms of price correction, or regulation”.27 Theoretically, by 
changing the incentive structure which actors face, the power of the market can be 
harnessed and directed toward the achievement of environmental goals promoting 
consonance between private choice and social interest.28 More specifically, in the 
                                                                                                                                
See also John Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2005) 138 
However, Golub has argued that environmental policy around the globe has been undergoing a 
“fundamental transition” with an enhanced emphasis on a “new arsenal of flexible and efficient policy 
tools”. 
See Jonathan Golub, New Instruments for Environmental Policy in the EU (Routledge 1998) xiii 
21 Robert Hahn, ‘Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed 
the Doctor’s Orders’ (1989) 3(2) Journal of Economic Perspectives 95, 95 
22 Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 
23 John Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (Toronto University Press 1968) and Allen Kneese and Blair 
Bower, Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions (John Hopkins University Press 1968) 
24 H. Scott Gordon, ‘The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery’ (1954) 62 
Journal of Political Economy 124 and Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 
Science 1243 
Monbiot has argued that the narrative of the commons is fundamentally flawed. “In reality, traditional 
commons are closely regulated by the people who live there. In a true commons, everyone watches 
everyone else, for they know that anyone over-exploiting a resource is exploiting them”. 
See George Monbiot, ‘The Tragedy of Enclosure’ (1994) 270(1) Scientific American 159 
25 “[H]uman-induced climate change is an externality, one that is not ‘corrected’ through any 
institution or market, unless policy intervenes”. 
See Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University Press 2007) 
24 
26 Timothy Swanson, ‘Economic Instruments and Environmental Regulation: A Critical Introduction’ 
(1995) 4(4) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 287, 288 
27 Nicholas Stern, A Blueprint for a Safer Planet: How We Can Save the World and Create Prosperity (Vintage 
2010) 11 
28 T.H. Tietenberg, ‘Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation’ (1990) 6(1) Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 17 
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context of emissions, an optimal allocation of emissions should develop through 
market trading. Entities willing to pay the most for allowances are the ones who face 
the highest costs of reducing emissions. Consistently, emissions cuts will be achieved 
by entities and sectors most adept at delivering reductions, thereby promoting 
economically efficient outcomes. Inevitably, some entities and installations may well 
be better equipped or more favourably positioned structurally to minimise their 
emissions.29 
However, it is important to emphasise that most advocates of economic 
incentivisation do not favour an entirely unregulated free market philosophy in this 
arena.30 Whilst free market environmentalism envisions the allocation of property-
rights for natural resources to private interests with the market determining the value 
of environmental goods, the more commonly advanced philosophy underlying 
economic instruments, aptly articulated by Rehbinder, is that “the market should be 
used for economic efficiency purposes in a merely instrumental way in order to 
achieve environmental policy goals that continue to be set by the state”.31 Emissions 
trading is not, as Zapfel and Vainio have emphasised, primarily about trading but 
rather deploying a mechanism that allows or increases the likelihood of realising a 
specified environmental objective.32 In this sense, Golub has appropriately 
characterised this re-imagining of regulation as “re-regulation rather than 
deregulation”,33 despite long-standing concerns that movement towards economic 
incentivisation approaches may contribute to or cause light-touch regulation.34  
It is evident too that this process of re-regulation, in the context of climate 
law, entails the integration of complex multi-level governance processes across 
differing levels of social activity involving state and non-state actors.35 As such, this 
approach does not represent an abandonment of any state role in regulation. Rather, 
it suggests a re-scaling of the state whereby the state decides to participate in regulation 
at selective stages and consciously chooses to act in concert with non-state actors. The 
narrative of state decline struggles to fully capture such fluid and complex processes 
of governance and the different, though potent, mechanisms of influence, which the 
state continues to retain. 
 
                                                
29 Some sectors emissions allocations during the pilot phase of the EU ETS were also restrained more 
than others. For example in the UK, power plants received on average, 72% of reference emissions, 
whilst cement manufacturers received 96.5% and chemical plants received 88% of reference 
emissions.  
See James Allen and Anthony White, ‘Carbon Trading’ (2005) 30(5) Electric Perspectives 50, 54 
30 Such as has been advocated by Anderson and Leal.  
See Terry Anderson and Donald Leal, ‘Free Market Versus Political Environmentalism’ (1992) 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 297 
31 Eckard Rehbinder, ‘Ecological Contracts: Agreements Between Polluters and Local Communities’ 
in Gunther Teubner, Lindsay Farmer, and Declan Murphy (eds), Environmental Law and Ecological 
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Self-Organization (John Wiley & Sons 1994) 147 
32 Peter Zapfel and Matti Vainio, ‘Pathways to European Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: History 
and Misconceptions’ (2002) Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 85/2002, 21 
33 Jonathan Golub, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in Jonathan Golub, New Instruments for Environmental 
Policy in the EU (Routledge 1998) 8 
34 See, for example, Howard Latin, ‘Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of 
Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms’ (1983) 54 Stanford Law Review 1267 and 
more recently, Robert Baldwin ‘Regulation Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading’ (2008) 2 Regulation 
& Governance 193 
35 Gerard H. Kelly, “Surveying Emissions Trading Through a Multi-Level Governance Lens” in 
Vasilka Sancin (ed), International Environmental Law: Contemporary Concerns and Challenges (GV Publishing 
2012) 329  
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(C) The Advent of Market Trading in the United States 
Deatherage has recently suggested that market trading retains a distinctive “made in 
America” imprint, observing that “[c]ap and trade concepts were invented in the 
United States”.36 Although this may appear somewhat surprising in the post-Kyoto 
landscape, given the United States’ hostility to ratifying the Protocol and the 
flexibility mechanisms mandated under it, it is undoubtedly true that the application 
of market trading concepts in the United States and the academic commentary and 
analysis which accompanied this experience was highly influential in the 
development of carbon trading in the EU.37 By the mid-1990s, market trading had 
“com[e] of age in the policy arena”,38 particularly with the advent of the United 
States’ sulphur dioxide trading scheme in 1995. This “Grand Policy Experiment” 
provided an early template for the EU ETS and it is still widely regarded as the 
genesis of the many different trading systems operating today.39 As Convery has 
explained: 
 
This experience [of emissions trading] and the associate analyses 
provided European economists with insights to apply to the 
European situation, and provided officials in both Member States 
and the Commission with a body of literature and people to 
interrogate and to learn from. Information was generously provided 
by both the research and analytical community and the practitioners 
in the US Environmental Protection Agency and elsewhere.40 
 
The US emissions trading programme, authorised under the Clean Air Act 
1990, was extolled in many quarters as a success with claims that abatement costs 
were considerably less than would otherwise have been the case under traditional 
regulatory approaches.41 Early forecasts had indicated that the programme would 
cost $6 billion annually once it was fully implemented. However, actual estimated 
costs were considerably lower, in the region of $1.1 to $1.8 billion, less than 30% of 
                                                
36 Scott Deatherage, Carbon Trading Law and Practice (Oxford University Press 2011) 20 
37 Notably, the impact of Canadian scholar John Dales’ seminal work “Pollution, Property and Prices” 
can hardly be overstated when considering the conceptual evolution of market trading. 
38 Robert Hahn and Robert Stavins, ‘Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Integrating 
Theory and Practice’ (1992) 82(2) American Economic Review 464 
39 The term was coined by Stavins in his evaluation of the success of the US sulphur dioxide trading 
scheme. 
See Robert Stavins, ‘What Can We Learn From the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons From SO2 
Allowance Trading’ (1998) 12(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 69 
40 Frank Convery, ‘Origins and Development of the EU ETS’ (2009) 43 Environmental and Resource 
Economics 391, 397 
41 For example, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), a US-based environmental NGO, praised 
emissions trading, observing it achieved “superior environmental protection by giving businesses both 
flexibility and a direct financial incentive to find faster, cheaper, and more innovative ways to reduce 
pollution”. 
See EDF, ‘The Cap and Trade Success Story’ UNICEF (2011) < 
http://env.chass.utoronto.ca/env200y/ESSAY08/EnvironmentalDefense.pdf> accessed 16 
September 2013 
The American experience with sulphur dioxide trading, however, has also been criticised for lacking 
environmental ambition. Smith, for example, has observed that “Germany cut power plant sulphur 
emissions by 90% from the first proposal in 1982 to the completion of its programme in 1998, relying 
on firm regulation and legislation and no trading scheme of any sort.” 
See Kevin Smith, ‘Stern Words While in the EU They’re Trading Hot Air’ (2006) 10(11) Parliamentary 
Brief 25, 26 
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original predictions.42 The trading programme achieved its core environmental 
objective and significantly reduced SO2 emissions by 22% below mandated levels 
during the scheme’s first phase.43 Ellermann et al concluded that the core lesson of 
the experience was that large-scale tradable permits programs can work more or less 
as textbooks describe: market trading had completed its migration from theory to 
practice.44 
The success of sulphur dioxide trading in the United States provided further 
support for the argument that the traditional positioning of economic and 
environmental principles as diametrically opposed objectives was outdated and that it 
was possible to construct a regulatory framework which accommodated – indeed 
even advanced – both interests.45 However, it would be disingenuous to overlook the 
significant volume of criticism, which continues to surround the perceived intrusion 
of economic principles into environmental value determinations, an intrusion which, 
it has often been argued, only serves to ultimately weaken the environmental integrity 
of governance arrangements.46 Nor has the claimed success of economic 
incentivisation approaches been universally acknowledged. Golub makes a salient 
point, linked to von Homeyer’s layering phenomenon discussed earlier, that 
economic incentivisation “instruments have almost invariably been applied in the 
EU as merely one tool within a package, supplementing pre-exisiting command-and-
control regulation”.47 In such circumstances it is difficult to isolate the perceived 
advantages and successes of economic incentivisation approaches from the influence 
of the surrounding governance landscape, much of which may remain traditional in 
character.48 This should not be surprising, as a clear causal pattern is rarely as 
demonstrable in the social sciences as exact sciences. Instead, as Braithwaite and 
Drahos have observed, shedding light on why something happened may be possible 
by identification of a causal mechanism that led to an event, but why that mechanism 
rather than another was triggered is likely to remain under a veil.49 For example, the 
innovation dividend of market trading, sometimes accepted as given, has remained 
                                                
42 ibid 
43 ibid 
44 A. Denny Ellermann and others, Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program (Cambridge 
University Press 2000) 315 
45 It should be noted that a growing school of thought suggests that the notion of an inevitable 
struggle between the environment and the economy is a misplaced premise and that “properly 
designed environmental standards can trigger innovation that may partially or more than fully offset 
the costs of complying with them” – the so-called “Porter hypothesis”. 
See Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde, ‘Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship’ (1995) 9(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 97, 98 
46 Eckersley, for example, has expressed concern that economic incentivisation approaches are 
philosophically misguided. 
See Robyn Eckersley, ‘Markets, the State, and the Environment: An Overview’ in Robyn Eckersley, 
Markets, the State and the Environment: Towards Integration (Macmillan 1995) 12 
47 Golub refers to the much publicised shift to unleaded petrol which is often attributed to the effects 
of taxation policies, noting that command and control requirements to equip cars with catalytic 
convertors was also highly influential. 
See Jonathan Golub, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in Jonathan Golub, New Instruments for Environmental 
Policy in the EU (Routledge 1998) 22 
48 ibid 
49 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2011) 15 
Importantly mechanisms, in this sense, are distinguished from general laws, as commonly applied in 
the exact sciences, which allow with certitude the formation of conclusions both in an explanatory 
and predictive sense. 
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the subject of considerable debate.50  Specifically with respect to the US sulphur 
dioxide trading scheme, Taylor, Rubin, and Hounshell have commented that “the 
weight of evidence of the history of innovation in SO2 control technology does not 
support the superiority of … emissions trading as an inducement for environmental 
technological innovation, as compared with the effects of traditional environmental 
policy approaches”.51 Distilling the causative influence of economic incentivisation 
approaches, from the broader traditional regulatory landscape within which they are 
often located, remains a challenging endeavour. As noted at the outset, the debate 
concerning the relative merits of economic incentivisation approaches continues 
with respect to the EU ETS. However, recognition of the validity of rival 
perspectives in this context, though reconsideration of such critical commentaries do 
not form the subject matter of this paper, is nonetheless important.52 These critiques 
remain of enduring critical value to alternative visions of governance arrangements, 
particularly frameworks less influenced by (or anchored to) economic incentivisation 
approaches. The case for market trading does not enjoy unanimous support and 
advocates of a vision of climate governance dominated by linked carbon markets are 
challenged to continue to justify their approach with increasing clarity in the quality 
of their arguments. 
 
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE EU ETS 
 
(A) EU Climate Leadership 
As Voß has acknowledged the development of emissions trading has had 
“considerable influence in the transformation of environmental governance regimes 
throughout the world”.53 It is, perhaps, in the EU that this influence has been most 
penetrating, impressive, and enduring. As we have seen, market trading has now 
become the “flagship measure” in the EU’s climate change policy toolkit.54 Adoption 
of emissions trading in the EU also signalled a considerable paradigm shift in 
governance from a largely command-and-control topography to confidence in the 
centrality of the market to the climate governance landscape. The endurance of this 
instrument is aptly demonstrated by the EU’s continuing emphasis on the long term 
contribution of the EU ETS to climate policy. Despite international uncertainty 
regarding a post-Kyoto settlement, the EU has unilaterally committed itself to 
delivering 20% carbon cuts by 2020 irrespective of whether or not an international 
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agreement is concluded.55 The achievement of this objective is largely dependent 
upon the success of the EU ETS. Moreover, the Commission has presented plans 
for a fourth trading phase from 2021 – 2028 during which auctioning will become 
the sole means of allocation.56 From an EU perspective, it is clear that emissions 
trading is not a transient regulatory innovation: it is now a central pillar of the EU’s 
climate governance philosophy.57 
By establishing the EU ETS the EU has also attempted to reinforce its 
climate governance leadership credentials, whilst remaining competitive in an 
unevenly carbon-regulated world. Damro and Luaces Méndez have correctly 
highlighted that the “thrust of EU climate change [policy] has reflected a desire to 
claim Union leadership, both externally and internally, in the policy field”.58 For 
example, the EU’s ambitious vision of implementing OECD-wide carbon trading by 
2015 with further expansion to transitional economies represents not only a 
confident statement of the EU’s faith in emissions trading as a core regulatory tool in 
climate governance, but also the EU’s confidence in its directional leadership. It is 
also a not-too-subtle attempt to influence the design and rules of any emerging 
international trading system. The possibility that the EU ETS could eventually form 
the nucleus of a global trading architecture had long been recognised by the 
Commission and with nascent emissions trading schemes in Australasia and the 
United States, and the expansion of the EU ETS to include EFTA states, this 
objective remains firmly fixed as an EU policy goal.59 Consistently, the importance of 
playing a formative role in the early development of the design features of emissions 
trading was also recognised. By the elaboration of its own dominant scheme, the EU 
could aspire to become the international standard-setter “in control of the most 
important international regulatory effort to limit greenhouse gases”.60 Environment 
Commissioner, Ritt Bjerregaard, was explicit about the importance of such influence: 
“We have to get involved in emissions trading… we cannot let others dictate the 
rules”.61  
The importance of this process of shaping and influencing the development 
of emissions trading has also been recognised as a significant motivating factor at the 
national level. Whilst Germany had initially been cool towards the possibility of 
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market trading,62 Zapfel and Vainio have emphasised that “[t]he possibility to be 
involved in the early stages and influence rule development was a major engine to 
power German interest in the new and coming instrument”.63 Such a strategy may be 
interpreted as an effort to minimise the administrative adjustment costs expected to 
follow from the introduction of emissions trading, a driver, which has been 
highlighted elsewhere in European environmental regulation.64 The Commission has 
also identified the significance of securing “first mover” advantage in the 
environmental sphere suggesting that “in an increasingly competitive world 
environmental performance can be a factor giving companies or their products a 
competitive edge”.65 Recognition of the importance of influencing the development 
of the key characteristics of a carbon trading scheme also suggests that, as the EU 
seeks to export the design features of the EU ETS, third country partners may lack 
the same incentives to engage which, at least partially, motivated the EU’s initial 
conversion to emissions trading. However, securing “first mover advantage” by 
playing an early pioneering role in the implementation of emissions trading does not 
fully explain the remarkable change in the EU’s attitude towards the use of this 
instrument. 
 
(B) Why the Change in Position Towards Emissions Trading? 
In a very short space of time, emissions trading moved from being a non-considered 
policy option for the EU to become the cornerstone of EU climate policy.66 The 
EU’s change in position has been described as moving from “follower to leader”67 
and – perhaps more accurately – from “sceptic to frontrunner”.68 However, 
Ellermann and others suggest that it is not only in the EU that this conversion 
process has occurred. In the United States too “emissions trading has gone from 
being a pariah among policymakers to being a star”69 and it may well be that there is 
something in Convery’s observation that “emissions trading was an idea whose time 
had come”.70 However, in the context of the EU’s remarkable change, how has this 
process occurred and are there lessons in this evolution which may be of relevance as 
the EU looks to broaden the horizons of the EU ETS? 
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 The Commission had originally unveiled the introduction of a carbon tax as 
the core component of its climate governance strategy. Damro and Luaces Méndez 
have noted that the perceived interrelatedness of economics and climate change 
contributed to the creation of a perspective where it was considered too difficult to 
steer climate governance by traditional command-and-control regulation alone.71 In 
this respect, the concept of a carbon tax represented a significant step towards the 
harnessing of market forces in the field of environmental governance, a not 
uncontroversial progression in itself.72 However, little progress was achieved in 
devising substantive measures to coordinate Member States’ climate policies 
throughout the 1990s and the concept of a carbon tax floundered amidst national 
sovereignty and competitiveness concerns. Key Member States such as Spain and the 
UK were vociferously opposed to a carbon tax which, as a fiscal matter, required 
unanimity in the Council of Ministers to pass into legislation.73 Expanding on the 
EU’s competitiveness concerns, Huber has attributed the failure to introduce an EU-
wide carbon tax to a “cost-free leadership” vision, where the Commission and 
Member States were reluctant to act without securing commitments from the US and 
Japan to introduce comparable energy and CO2 taxes.
74 Instead, Member States 
forged ahead with diverse climate policies encompassing traditional regulation, 
energy and CO2 taxes, and voluntary agreements. As it became clear that a 
harmonised EU tax was increasingly unlikely, the Commission encouraged Member 
States to establish national taxes on a product-by-product basis.75 
 However, developments were also already in motion nudging the EU 
towards emissions trading. European industry was moving towards an acceptance of 
emissions trading – a process which was particularly evident when BP announced the 
launch of an internal emissions trading scheme in 1998 with Shell following suit 
shortly after. Commission insiders recognised such developments constituted 
“increasingly powerful drivers”,76 but the prospect of proliferating individual national 
trading schemes, whilst welcome laboratories of the concept of market trading in 
practice, also raised the risk of creating a patchwork of domestic schemes with 
potentially conflicting rules and market distortions. In 1999 the Danish Parliament 
approved a bill on CO2 quotas for electricity production as part of legislative reform 
of the electricity sector. Whilst only eight companies participated in the trading 
scheme, it nonetheless covered more than 90% of emissions from power generation. 
In 2002 the UK Government endorsed and financially supported a pilot scheme 
developed by an association of business actors, the Emissions Trading Group. The 
advantages of “first mover” were again emphasised, with Voß suggesting that this 
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experiential head start on global carbon markets was “a key argument in advertising 
the initiative to government and societal stakeholders”.77 
Emissions trading was also gaining momentum beyond its contribution to 
climate governance as a distinct and thriving service economy and was beginning to 
actively lobby for expansion of its market.78 A commercial infrastructure rapidly 
developed encompassing consultancies, banks, brokers, exchanges, risk managers, 
and lawyers. The International Emissions Trading Association was established in 
1999 to promote the worldwide development of emissions markets. Several 
commentators have highlighted the broad support for emissions trading which 
existed from a wide range of business and industry groups across the EU,79 a 
perspective further underscored by the Commission’s own consultations with 
industry stakeholders.80 This “conscious collective effort of the Commission to co-
operate with stakeholders”81 also reveals a reality of climate governance framework 
which is invariably multi-level and multi-actor, a theme which has been the subject of 
considerable scholarly debate.82 Convergence of industry and government 
perspectives, although not universal, is also consistent with a fundamental hypothesis 
underpinning the attractiveness of market trading which Bakker describes as the 
“hope of a virtuous fusion of economic growth, efficiency, and environmental 
conservation”.83 Indeed, Bailey and Maresh have argued that the creation of the EU 
ETS “was made possible by a swift convergence among supranational, state, and 
industry actors around the regulatory logic of EU emissions trading as a cost-
effective means of achieving emissions targets agreed in the Kyoto Protocol”.84 Of 
course, this same regulatory logic had been rigorously advanced by the United States 
during negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, the persuasiveness of which had been 
highly contested by the EU. How then can we reconcile the EU’s later adoption of 
emissions trading with its previous vociferous opposition? 
 
(C) THE EU’S ESCAPE FROM NORM ENTRAPMENT 
As we have seen, in a number of ways the landscape was becoming increasingly 
benign towards the development of an EU-wide emissions trading scheme. Yet in 
the international sphere the debate about the appropriateness of emissions trading 
and its effectiveness continued to obstruct attempts to negotiate rules implementing 
the Kyoto Protocol. Indeed, heated exchanges surrounding emissions trading was 
one of the key conflicts contributing to the derailment of The Hague negotiations in 
2000. Whilst the multi-level considerations noted above represented powerful drivers 
in the process creating the EU ETS, the impact of the United States’ long-term 
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advocacy of emissions trading is perhaps the most mystifying. Damro and Luaces 
Méndez have characterised the transformation in the EU’s position as a process of 
policy transfer driven primarily by the EU’s perception of necessity.85 As 
commentators have emphasised, emissions trading was an alien policy instrument for 
the EU. As such, during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and later during The 
Hague negotiations, the EU was facing a potentially significant disadvantage because 
its own system was so completely unfamiliar with implementing this type of 
instrument. However, interaction in this transnational process ultimately also 
contributed to a progressive learning process within the EU regarding market 
trading. Whilst Damro and Luaces Méndez have characterised the EU’s subsequent 
implementation of an emissions trading scheme as “nothing more than the introduction 
of an instrument to deal with already established policy objectives”,86 Cass has 
instead persuasively emphasised the profound normative implications which 
acceptance and adoption of market trading by the EU necessarily required.87 
 Normative considerations are particularly influential within the EU actor 
constellation. Some scholars have suggested that the EU is a qualitatively distinct 
normative power emphasising “the ideational impact of the EU’s international 
identity/role as representing normative power”.88 During climate negotiations with 
the United States, the EU had emphasised the importance of domestic climate action 
and had sought to cap the use of flexibility mechanisms, rejecting the American 
approach as a crass attempt to “buy its way out of its Kyoto commitments”.89 
However, as a “synergistic and multi-level mix of factors”90 began to emerge 
propelling the EU towards emissions trading, the EU increasingly faced a situation 
aptly described as “norm entrapment”.91 Drawing on Schimmelfennig’s research in 
the context of the EU’s eastern expansion,92 Cass has defined this scenario as “the 
inability to pursue a preferred policy that violates a norm because of prior rhetorical 
affirmation of the norm”.93 Consequently, even as emissions trading garnered 
support internally, the EU remained trapped by the normative objections against the 
idea which it had raised earlier. As Voß has explained, substantial efforts were 
invested in reframing emissions trading from a strategic device in the hands of the 
United States to dilute binding emission reduction commitments to an effective and 
efficient instrument for climate governance in the EU.94 When the Bush 
administration withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001 describing it as 
fatally flawed, the necessary space was created for the EU to reframe emissions 
trading. As a result, a concept which the EU had previously and with considerable 
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success delegitimised as an American attempt to evade domestic responsibilities was 
instead reconstructed as a legitimate strategy to salvage the Kyoto Protocol. 
Ironically, the withdrawal of the United States from the Protocol, far from delivering 
the coup de grâce to the Kyoto framework,95 facilitated the rapid development of the 
world’s largest carbon market. As noted by Brussels insiders, “the huge luck the 
Commission had was Bush’s withdrawal...It united the EU in an extraordinary 
way.”96  
Yet the EU’s core aim of constructing an international framework was far 
from abandoned. The architects of the EU ETS recognised that whilst it represented 
“a major novelty in the way the EU approaches environmental regulation”,97 the EU 
ETS was also an experiment which could form the prototype for developments 
elsewhere. As Christiansen and Wettestad aptly recognised, the EU “sees its system 
in a more long-term, global perspective”.98 Some commentators expected the EU to 
lead attempts to develop new governance undertakings in the field, carving out a 
‘‘climate hegemon’’ role by not only challenging, but also persuading the United 
States to participate.99 An emphasis on the potential connectability of the EU ETS 
with schemes elsewhere, but particularly a trans-Atlantic link, has been thematic in 
the literature.100 However, the stellar growth of emissions trading has raised 
numerous concerns and it is important that the instrument does not become an end 
in itself. Bailey and Wilson have cautioned that the convergence of government and 
industry viewpoints concerning emissions trading risks contributing towards a 
potential ideological and policy “lock in”.101 However, as emphasised earlier, 
perspectives challenging the dominance of emissions trading in climate law remain of 
enduring critical value by re-evaluating the ideological foundations and social and 
environmental consequences of the new carbon economy and re-imagining 
alternative governance frameworks. Such critiques are also fundamental to the 
process of institutional learning which has long been acknowledged as crucial to the 
EU ETS project.102 During the first two phases of the EU ETS, a spirit of 
experimentalism was especially evident and openly acknowledged. In fact, this 
                                                
95 David Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton 
University Press 2001)  
96 Jørgen Wettestad, ‘The Making of the 2003 EU Emissions Trading Directive: An Ultra-Quick 
Process due to Entrepreneurial Efficiency’ (2005) 5(1) Global Environmental Politics 1, 17 
97 Jos Delbeke, ‘The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): The Cornerstone of the EU’s Implementation 
of the Kyoto Protocol’ (2006) 1(2) European Review of Energy Markets 1, 11 
98 Atle Christiansen and Jørgen Wettestad, ‘The EU as a Frontrunner on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading: How Did it Happen and Will the EU Succeed’ (2003) 3 Climate Policy 3, 16 
99 Christian Egenhofer and Thomas Legge, “After Marrakech: The Regionalisation of the Kyoto 
Protocol”, Centre for European Policy Studies (2001) 
<http://old.ceps.eu/Article.php?article_id=232> accessed 17 September 2013 
100 Atle Christiansen and Jørgen Wettestad, ‘The EU as a Frontrunner on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading: How Did it Happen and Will the EU Succeed’ (2003) 3 Climate Policy 3, 15; Frank Convery, 
‘Origins and Development of the EU ETS’ (2009) 43 Environmental and Resource Economics 391, 
405 
101 They elaborate: “[T]he faith apparently being placed in carbon commodification by international 
and national institutions, corporations, and individuals suggests the reproduction and ‘locking in’ of 
neoliberal, market-driven logics as an accepted methodology for dealing with climate change.” 
See Ian Bailey and Geoff Wilson, ‘Theorising Transitional Pathways in Response to Climate Change: 
Technocentrism, Ecocentrism, and the Carbon Economy’ (2009) 41 Environment and Planning A 
2324, 2335 
102 As Jos Delbeke has emphasised: “‘Learning by doing’ is an important in-built feature of the 
Emissions Trading Directive”. 
See Jos Delbeke, ‘Foreword’ in Farhana Yamin (ed), Climate Change and Carbon Markets: A Handbook of 
Emission Reduction Mechanisms (Earthscan 2005) xviii 
98                                    Kelly: Origins of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
experimentalist theme has arguably been a key element of the nascent governance 
framework since its inception and arguably guards against the concern that 
governance could become overly prescriptive.103 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The implementation of the EU ETS has given rise to a paradoxical situation. In an 
extraordinarily short space of time emissions trading has evolved from being a much 
maligned and marginalised instrument to becoming the cornerstone of EU climate 
governance. The emergence of the EU as one of the primary innovators of emissions 
trading by developing the EU ETS as well as advocating an international trading 
framework has resulted in a certain Europeanisation of the concept. This was far 
from predictable. 
 However, as Convery has identified, the sapling, which became the EU ETS 
was a product of two failures.104 First, the carbon tax initiative, which the 
Commission had championed throughout the 1990s failed to navigate the Scylla of 
competitiveness reservations and the Charybdis of national sovereignty concerns. 
Even with political agreement, it was increasingly recognised that achieving the 
desired emissions reductions from taxation initiatives would likely require successive 
iterative “trial-and-error” adjustments in tax rates.105 Second, the Commission’s 
efforts during negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol to prevent the inclusion of 
flexibility mechanisms were ultimately unsuccessful. Damro and Luaces Méndez 
have commented that the question of whether emissions trading would have been 
adopted by the EU “in the absence of the protocol remains partially unanswered”.106 
However, it is extraordinarily difficult to envisage conditions under which the EU 
could have escaped from the norm entrapment within which it was confined 
following its intensive activity to delegitimise emissions trading during international 
negotiations. 
 Pohlmann has acknowledged that multiple factors contributed to the EU’s 
shift towards emissions trading.107 The inclusion of the concept in the Kyoto 
Protocol certainly gave rise to a perception that the practical implementation was 
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more a matter of “how”, rather than “if”.108 The literature also reveals the 
considerable contribution of individual policy entrepreneurs, located within the 
Commission, to the evolution of the concept.109 In fact, Braun and Santarius have 
suggested that the process of policy formation was dominated “by three or four 
‘policy entrepreneurs’ who… repeatedly found ways to speed up the policy process, 
expand the room for manoeuvre and to create new latitude for other players”.110 This 
is consistent with Wettestad’s perspective that the implementation of the EU ETS 
represented an ultra-quick process due to entrepreneurial efficiency.111 
Whilst the lack of progress in the 1990s towards the implementation of 
effective EU climate governance mechanisms contributed to the positioning of a 
previously untried instrument centre stage, the synergistic and multi-level 
convergence of diverse actors’ interests reinforced the perceived valuable 
contribution which emissions trading could make to loosening the Gordian knot of 
climate change. Moreover, this was also consistent with a reframing process which 
was already underway, redefining environment-economy relations as potentially 
mutually supportive rather than antagonistic and a developing confidence in the 
EU’s climate leadership potential. However, the multi-scalar and multi-actor nature 
of the developing EU ETS has also raised significant questions regarding climate 
governance in the EU. The development of the design features of the EU ETS 
required mediation between competing state and industry interests, but this dialogue 
has occurred within a governance space where contestation and competition remain 
as evident as control. Moreover, the EU’s vocal championing of emissions trading 
remains a high-risk strategy from a policy perspective. Whilst the espousal of 
emissions trading has contributed to repositioning climate governance as a core 
Union policy objective, success or failure in this sphere will most definitely affect the 
EU’s external presence.112 
Nonetheless, as the EU ETS continues to occupy a preeminent position in 
the EU’s climate governance landscape, it can be expected that the intertwining of 
scales and actor constellations necessary to implement emissions trading in the EU 
will continue to have major implications for the internationalisation and governability 
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of emissions trading.113 The process by which the EU developed its emissions trading 
scheme, particularly the drivers influencing this process, offer salient lessons for 
third countries considering the adoption of market trading. The prior inexperience of 
the EU in deploying market instruments in an environmental context coupled with 
deeply embedded normative objections concerning the role of the market, whilst 
delaying the EU’s embrace of emissions trading, ultimately failed to stymy this 
regulatory evolution. 
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